Publish quixos-nix-helpers from 932fe7714761fb8b5db4bd6401357cdff762a428

This commit is contained in:
Quixos Subtree Publisher
2026-10-08 05:08:28 +00:00
15 changed files with 545 additions and 121 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
{
"version": 1,
"sourceRepo": "https://gitea-external.egads.tutti.syntaxblitz.net/quixos/quixos",
"sourceCommit": "abc91ab1cbbd61ffd7f0a49dbc5768598ac8745c",
"sourceCommit": "932fe7714761fb8b5db4bd6401357cdff762a428",
"sourcePath": "quixos-instance/quixos-nix-helpers",
"exportName": "quixos-nix-helpers",
"mirrorRemote": "https://gitea-external.egads.tutti.syntaxblitz.net/quixos/quixos-nix-helpers.git"
+12 -7
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@@ -113,8 +113,9 @@ service = {
};
```
Each invocation gets a fresh engine process. The adapter admits one active frame
and a bounded FIFO; queue wait consumes the deadline. Overflow is an explicit
Each invocation gets a fresh Worker in a reusable engine process. An engine runs
one active frame; the adapter has bounded concurrency and queueing. Queue wait
consumes the deadline. Overflow is an explicit
`RESTRICTED_QUEUE_FULL` result. Cancellation kills the engine process group and
removes its sockets before acknowledgement. All graph calls inherit the trusted
invocation identity; authored code cannot choose another frame or workspace.
@@ -127,11 +128,15 @@ parent environment credentials, and unlisted modules are denied. Explicit dates,
available. Host-managed HTTP bridges expose only the current frame's declared
graph ports. Authored serialization is untrusted protocol input.
This is an inner execution restriction, **not a hardened shared-process sandbox**.
One workspace owns the surrounding VM. Systemd limits the entire package cgroup,
including adapter and child engines; memory exhaustion terminates that group.
No per-isolate memory protection is claimed. A guest user can control its VM,
so authoritative graph grants and credentials must remain outside it.
The packaged runtime uses the platform's Bubblewrap/seccomp launcher. Only the
engine's read-only runtime closure and private broker directory are mounted;
native filesystem/process/network escape probes qualify that boundary. Systemd
limits the whole package in a workspace VM. Shared authority additionally charges
each engine to its own cgroup before launch. No per-isolate memory protection or
Cloudflare hosted side-channel defenses are claimed. See the
[runtime decision](../../docs/RESTRICTED_RUNTIME_DECISION.md#os-process-confinement-implementation)
for the exact boundary and residual risks. A guest user can control its VM, so
authoritative graph grants and credentials must remain outside it.
Qualification commands:
+1 -12
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@@ -96,18 +96,7 @@ let
esbuild = "${pkgs.esbuild}/bin/esbuild";
shell = "${pkgs.runtimeShell}";
serviceAdapter = ./portable-service.mjs;
restricted =
if service.restricted or false then
let
executor = import ./restricted-execution { inherit pkgs core; };
in
{
runtime = "${executor.runtime}/bin/quixos-restricted-registry";
sdk = "${executor.sdk}/core.mjs";
limits = service.limits or { };
}
else
null;
restrictedSDK = "${(import ./restricted-execution { inherit pkgs core; }).sdk}/core.mjs";
}
);
compiled =
+41 -4
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@@ -128,8 +128,7 @@ for (const { target, mode, settings } of builds) {
const bundlePath =
mode === "remote" ? "share/quixos/remote/server/module.mjs" : `share/quixos/portable/${target}/module.mjs`;
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(path.join(output, bundlePath)), { recursive: true });
const restricted = !!config.restricted && target === "server";
const coreImport = target === "browser" ? coreURL : restricted ? config.restricted.sdk : coreServer;
const coreImport = target === "browser" ? coreURL : coreServer;
const metadata = path.join(work, "bundle-meta.json");
measureBuild("portable-bundle", { package: pkg.revision, target, mode }, () =>
execFileSync(
@@ -137,7 +136,7 @@ for (const { target, mode, settings } of builds) {
[
entry,
"--bundle",
`--platform=${target === "browser" || restricted ? "browser" : "node"}`,
`--platform=${target === "browser" ? "browser" : "node"}`,
"--format=esm",
"--minify-whitespace",
"--target=es2024",
@@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ for (const { target, mode, settings } of builds) {
(i) =>
i.external &&
i.path !== coreImport &&
!(target === "server" && !restricted && builtinModules.includes(i.path.replace(/^node:/, ""))),
!(target === "server" && builtinModules.includes(i.path.replace(/^node:/, ""))),
),
)
)
@@ -182,6 +181,44 @@ for (const { target, mode, settings } of builds) {
files: [await recordFile(bundlePath, "text/javascript"), ...sharedFiles],
};
implementations.push({ ...body, contentDigest: compiler.implementationDigest(body) });
if (target === "server" && mode !== "remote" && exports.length) {
// A closed candidate is not an eligibility claim. The host checks these
// bytes and its exact qualified SDK before admitting it to the sandbox.
// Keep a normal service implementation for unsupported dependencies.
const restrictedPath = "share/quixos/restricted/module.mjs";
const sdkPath = "share/quixos/restricted/core.mjs";
const sdkName = "quixos:restricted-sdk/v1";
await fs.mkdir(path.dirname(path.join(output, restrictedPath)), { recursive: true });
await fs.copyFile(config.restrictedSDK, path.join(output, sdkPath));
measureBuild("restricted-bundle", { package: pkg.revision }, () =>
execFileSync(
config.esbuild,
[
entry,
"--bundle",
"--platform=node",
"--format=esm",
"--minify-whitespace",
"--target=es2024",
`--outfile=${path.join(output, restrictedPath)}`,
`--alias:@quixos/camino-replica-core=${sdkName}`,
`--external:${sdkName}`,
],
{ cwd: work, stdio: "inherit" },
),
);
const restricted = {
id: "restricted-module",
target: "server",
compatibility: "quixos-restricted-module-v1",
path: restrictedPath,
ports: "quixos-transaction-ports-v1",
registryExport: settings.registryExport,
exports,
files: [await recordFile(restrictedPath, "text/javascript"), await recordFile(sdkPath, "text/javascript")],
};
implementations.push({ ...restricted, contentDigest: compiler.implementationDigest(restricted) });
}
}
const components =
config.group && !config.components
+4 -57
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@@ -13,62 +13,6 @@ export async function buildService({
recordFile,
}) {
const relative = compiler.artifactPath;
if (config.restricted) {
if (config.service.entry || pkg.exports.some((e) => e.execution.kind === "remote"))
throw Error(
"Restricted services require portable snapshot/transaction exports; remote/custom services keep their VM path",
);
const modules = implementations.filter((i) => i.target === "server");
if (modules.length !== 1 || pkg.exports.some((e) => !modules[0].exports.includes(e.id)))
throw Error("Restricted service requires exactly one checked portable registry covering all exports");
const limits = config.restricted.limits;
if (!limits || typeof limits !== "object" || Array.isArray(limits))
throw Error("Restricted limits must be an object");
if (Object.keys(limits).some((key) => !["deadlineMs", "maxBytes", "maxPortCalls", "maxQueued"].includes(key)))
throw Error("Unknown restricted service limit");
for (const [key, min, max] of [
["deadlineMs", 1, 60000],
["maxBytes", 1024, 4194304],
["maxPortCalls", 1, 10000],
["maxQueued", 0, 64],
])
if (limits[key] !== undefined && (!Number.isSafeInteger(limits[key]) || limits[key] < min || limits[key] > max))
throw Error("Invalid restricted service limit " + key);
await fs.mkdir(path.join(output, "bin"), { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(path.join(output, "share/quixos/service"), { recursive: true });
const configFile = "share/quixos/service/restricted.json";
const module = modules[0];
await fs.writeFile(
path.join(output, configFile),
JSON.stringify({
module: path.relative("share/quixos/service", module.path),
registryExport: module.registryExport,
exports: module.exports,
sdk: [{ name: config.restricted.sdk, path: config.restricted.sdk }],
...limits,
}),
);
await fs.writeFile(
path.join(output, "bin/service"),
`#!${config.shell}\nservice_root=\${0%/*}/..\nexec ${config.restricted.runtime} "$service_root/${configFile}"\n`,
{ mode: 0o755 },
);
const body = {
id: "service",
target: "server",
compatibility: "quixos-service-v1",
path: "bin/service",
ports: "quixos-transaction-ports-v1",
exports: module.exports,
files: [
await recordFile("bin/service", "text/x-shellscript"),
await recordFile(configFile, "application/json"),
...module.files,
],
};
implementations.unshift({ ...body, contentDigest: compiler.implementationDigest(body) });
return;
}
if (pkg.exports.length || config.service.entry) {
await fs.mkdir(path.join(output, "bin"), { recursive: true });
await fs.mkdir(path.join(output, "share/quixos/service"), { recursive: true });
@@ -78,7 +22,10 @@ export async function buildService({
throw Error("Custom service entry must be JavaScript; use a separate typed/language build before packaging");
serviceEntry = path.join(config.source, relative(config.service.entry));
} else {
const modules = implementations.filter((implementation) => implementation.target === "server");
const modules = implementations.filter(
(implementation) =>
implementation.target === "server" && implementation.compatibility === "quixos-js-module-v1",
);
if (pkg.exports.some((entry) => !modules.some((module) => module.exports.includes(entry.id))))
throw Error("Generated service does not cover every package export; provide a custom service");
if (!modules.length) throw Error("Generated service requires a checked registry");
+34
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@@ -1,6 +1,36 @@
{ pkgs, core }:
let
workerd = import ./workerd.nix { inherit pkgs; };
sandbox = import ./sandbox.nix {
inherit pkgs;
runtime = workerd;
executable = "${workerd}/bin/workerd";
};
nativeProbe =
pkgs.runCommand "quixos-restricted-native-probe"
{
nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.stdenv.cc ];
}
''
mkdir -p "$out/bin"
$CC -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror ${./sandbox-probe.c} -o "$out/bin/probe"
'';
nativeProbeSandbox = import ./sandbox.nix {
inherit pkgs;
runtime = nativeProbe;
executable = "${nativeProbe}/bin/probe";
};
identityLauncher =
pkgs.runCommand "quixos-restricted-identity-launcher"
{
nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.stdenv.cc ];
}
''
mkdir -p "$out/bin"
$CC -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror ${./identity-launcher.c} \
-DSANDBOX_EXECUTABLE='"${sandbox}/bin/quixos-restricted-sandbox"' \
-o "$out/bin/quixos-restricted-engine"
'';
# Transaction-port/value adapters do not need the browser's CRDT/Wasm engine.
# Keep this surface explicit; it is bundled into checked restricted handlers.
sdk = pkgs.runCommand "quixos-restricted-sdk" { nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.esbuild ]; } ''
@@ -23,6 +53,7 @@ let
makeWrapper ${pkgs.nodejs_24}/bin/node "$out/bin/quixos-restricted-registry" \
--add-flags "$out/lib/service.mjs" \
--set QUIXOS_RESTRICTED_WORKERD ${workerd}/bin/workerd \
--set QUIXOS_RESTRICTED_SANDBOX ${sandbox}/bin/quixos-restricted-sandbox \
--set QUIXOS_RESTRICTED_WORKER "$out/lib/worker.mjs"
'';
qualification =
@@ -40,6 +71,9 @@ in
{
inherit
workerd
sandbox
identityLauncher
nativeProbeSandbox
sdk
runtime
qualification
+88
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@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <dirent.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/* Installed only as a narrowly executable NixOS wrapper. This trusted helper
* accepts no executable, environment, filesystem root or arbitrary UID. The
* caller is platform authority, never a workspace guest or authored Worker. */
static void fail(const char *message) {
fprintf(stderr, "RESTRICTED_IDENTITY: %s\n", message);
exit(125);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
const char *root = "/run/quixos-restricted-engines/";
uid_t caller = getuid();
gid_t group = getgid();
struct passwd *owner = getpwnam("quixos-graph");
if (geteuid() != 0) fail("privileged wrapper unavailable");
if (!owner) fail("authority identity unavailable");
if (caller != owner->pw_uid) fail("caller identity mismatch");
if (argc != 3) fail("invalid arguments");
char *end;
unsigned long number = strtoul(argv[2], &end, 10);
if (!*argv[2] || *end || number < 610000 || number >= 610064)
fail("invalid engine identity");
uid_t identity = (uid_t)number;
if (strlen(argv[1]) != strlen(root) + 16 || strncmp(argv[1], root, strlen(root)))
fail("invalid engine directory");
const char *name = argv[1] + strlen(root);
if (strncmp(name, "qx-engine-", 10) ||
strlen(name) != 16 || strspn(name + 10, "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789") != 6)
fail("invalid engine directory");
int parent = open("/run/quixos-restricted-engines", O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
struct stat info;
if (parent < 0 || fstat(parent, &info) || info.st_uid != caller || (info.st_mode & 066))
fail("invalid engine root");
int directory = openat(parent, name, O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW);
if (directory < 0 || fstat(directory, &info) || info.st_uid != caller || (info.st_mode & 077))
fail("invalid engine owner");
DIR *entries = fdopendir(dup(directory));
if (!entries) fail("engine entries");
struct dirent *entry;
unsigned int files = 0;
while ((entry = readdir(entries))) {
const char *file = entry->d_name;
if (!strcmp(file, ".") || !strcmp(file, "..")) continue;
int socket = !strcmp(file, "broker.sock");
if ((!socket && strcmp(file, "config.capnp") && strcmp(file, "parent.mjs")) ||
fstatat(directory, file, &info, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) || info.st_uid != caller ||
info.st_nlink != 1 || (socket ? !S_ISSOCK(info.st_mode) : !S_ISREG(info.st_mode)) ||
info.st_size > 4 * 1024 * 1024)
fail("unexpected engine file");
files++;
}
closedir(entries);
if (files != 3) fail("incomplete engine configuration");
const char *files_to_transfer[] = {"config.capnp", "parent.mjs", "broker.sock"};
for (size_t i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if (fchownat(directory, files_to_transfer[i], identity, group, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) ||
fchmodat(directory, files_to_transfer[i], 0660, 0))
fail("engine file ownership");
}
if (fchown(directory, identity, group) || fchmod(directory, 0770))
fail("engine directory ownership");
close(directory);
close(parent);
struct rlimit core = {0, 0};
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &core) || setgroups(0, NULL) ||
setresgid(identity, identity, identity) || setresuid(identity, identity, identity) ||
prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) || prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0))
fail("identity confinement");
/* The containing directory grants only its owner and authority access. A
* socket created by workerd must also admit authority's different UID/GID. */
umask(0000);
char *args[] = {SANDBOX_EXECUTABLE, argv[1], NULL};
clearenv();
execv(SANDBOX_EXECUTABLE, args);
fail("sandbox launch");
}
+28
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@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
{
executor,
enable,
controlGroup,
}:
{ config, lib, ... }:
{
config = lib.mkIf enable {
assertions = [
{
assertion = lib.all (user: user.uid == null || user.uid < 610000 || user.uid >= 610064) (
builtins.attrValues config.users.users
);
message = "UIDs 610000–610063 are reserved for restricted engine identities.";
}
];
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
"d /run/quixos-restricted-engines 0711 quixos-graph ${controlGroup} -"
];
security.wrappers.quixos-restricted-engine = {
source = "${executor.identityLauncher}/bin/quixos-restricted-engine";
owner = "root";
group = controlGroup;
permissions = "u+rx,g+rx,o-rwx";
setuid = true;
};
};
}
+64
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@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
static void check(int condition, const char *label) {
if (!condition) {
fprintf(stderr, "ESCAPE: %s (%s)\n", label, strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
int main(void) {
for (int fd = 3; fd < 256; fd++)
check(fcntl(fd, F_GETFD) < 0 && errno == EBADF, "inherited descriptor");
check(!getenv("QUIXOS_VM_SECRET"), "parent environment");
check(open("/etc/test-secret", O_RDONLY) < 0, "authority filesystem");
check(open("/sys/fs/cgroup/cgroup.procs", O_WRONLY) < 0, "resource controls");
check(open("/proc/1/root/etc/test-secret", O_RDONLY) < 0, "proc root escape");
check(socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM, "IPv4 socket");
check(socket(AF_INET6, SOCK_STREAM, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM, "IPv6 socket");
check(socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW, 0) < 0 && errno == EPERM, "netlink socket");
check(ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, NULL, NULL) < 0 && errno == EPERM, "ptrace");
check(unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) < 0, "nested user namespace");
pid_t child = fork();
if (child == 0) _exit(2);
check(child < 0 && errno == EPERM, "subprocess");
check(access("/bin/sh", X_OK) < 0, "ambient executable");
check(getppid() <= 1, "host process visibility");
struct sockaddr_un address = {.sun_family = AF_UNIX};
int outside = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
check(outside >= 0, "Unix socket support");
strcpy(address.sun_path, "/run/quixos-native-authority/test.sock");
check(connect(outside, (struct sockaddr *)&address, sizeof(address)) < 0,
"authority Unix socket");
close(outside);
outside = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
memset(address.sun_path, 0, sizeof(address.sun_path));
strcpy(address.sun_path + 1, "quixos-native-authority");
check(connect(outside, (struct sockaddr *)&address,
offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1 + strlen(address.sun_path + 1)) < 0,
"authority abstract socket");
close(outside);
char directory[4096];
check(getcwd(directory, sizeof(directory)) != NULL, "engine directory");
check(snprintf(address.sun_path, sizeof(address.sun_path), "%s/broker.sock", directory) <
(int)sizeof(address.sun_path), "broker path length");
int broker = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
check(broker >= 0 && connect(broker, (struct sockaddr *)&address, sizeof(address)) == 0,
"authorized broker");
check(write(broker, "sandbox-probe", 13) == 13, "broker write");
close(broker);
puts("RESTRICTED_NATIVE_SANDBOX_PASSED");
return 0;
}
+77
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@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/* Trusted, single-process admission gate. The supervisor charges this PID to
* its engine cgroup before releasing stdin. All subsequently created namespace
* helpers and threads inherit that charge. No authored code runs here. */
static void fail(const char *message) {
fprintf(stderr, "RESTRICTED_SANDBOX: %s\n", message);
exit(125);
}
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
struct stat info;
if (argc != 2 || argv[1][0] != '/' || strstr(argv[1], "/../") ||
lstat(argv[1], &info) || !S_ISDIR(info.st_mode) ||
info.st_uid != getuid() || (info.st_mode & 007))
fail("invalid engine directory");
char gate;
if (read(STDIN_FILENO, &gate, 1) != 1 || gate != 1)
fail("engine admission was not released");
int input = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
if (input < 0 || dup2(input, STDIN_FILENO) < 0)
fail("stdin");
close(input);
int filter = open(SANDBOX_FILTER, O_RDONLY);
if (filter < 0)
fail("seccomp filter");
char filter_fd[32];
snprintf(filter_fd, sizeof(filter_fd), "%d", filter);
char *args[4096];
size_t count = 0;
#define ARG(value) args[count++] = (value)
ARG(SANDBOX_BWRAP);
ARG("--unshare-all");
ARG("--unshare-user");
ARG("--die-with-parent");
ARG("--disable-userns");
ARG("--assert-userns-disabled");
ARG("--cap-drop"); ARG("ALL");
ARG("--hostname"); ARG("quixos-restricted");
ARG("--clearenv");
ARG("--setenv"); ARG("TZ"); ARG("UTC");
ARG("--setenv"); ARG("LANG"); ARG("C.UTF-8");
FILE *closure = fopen(SANDBOX_CLOSURE, "r");
if (!closure)
fail("runtime closure");
char *line = NULL;
size_t capacity = 0;
while (getline(&line, &capacity, closure) >= 0) {
line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = 0;
if (strncmp(line, "/nix/store/", 11) || strchr(line, ' ') || count > 4000)
fail("runtime closure entry");
char *path = strdup(line);
if (!path)
fail("runtime closure allocation");
ARG("--ro-bind"); ARG(path); ARG(path);
}
fclose(closure);
free(line);
ARG("--proc"); ARG("/proc");
ARG("--dev"); ARG("/dev");
ARG("--tmpfs"); ARG("/tmp");
ARG("--bind"); ARG(argv[1]); ARG(argv[1]);
ARG("--chdir"); ARG(argv[1]);
ARG("--seccomp"); ARG(filter_fd);
ARG("--"); ARG(SANDBOX_EXECUTABLE);
ARG("serve"); ARG("--experimental"); ARG("config.capnp");
ARG(NULL);
execv(SANDBOX_BWRAP, args);
fail("bubblewrap failed");
}
+30
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@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
{
pkgs,
runtime,
executable,
}:
let
closure = pkgs.closureInfo { rootPaths = [ runtime ]; };
filter =
pkgs.runCommand "quixos-restricted-seccomp"
{
nativeBuildInputs = [
pkgs.stdenv.cc
pkgs.pkg-config
];
buildInputs = [ pkgs.libseccomp ];
}
''
$CC -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror ${./seccomp.c} $(pkg-config --cflags --libs libseccomp) -o filter
./filter > "$out"
'';
in
pkgs.runCommand "quixos-restricted-sandbox" { nativeBuildInputs = [ pkgs.stdenv.cc ]; } ''
mkdir -p "$out/bin"
$CC -O2 -Wall -Wextra -Werror ${./sandbox.c} \
-DSANDBOX_BWRAP='"${pkgs.bubblewrap}/bin/bwrap"' \
-DSANDBOX_EXECUTABLE='"${executable}"' \
-DSANDBOX_FILTER='"${filter}"' \
-DSANDBOX_CLOSURE='"${closure}/store-paths"' \
-o "$out/bin/quixos-restricted-sandbox"
''
+54
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@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <seccomp.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
/* Layered on an empty mount tree, fresh PID/user/network namespaces, no caps,
* no inherited descriptors and an immutable runtime closure. Deny kernel and
* process escape surfaces; retain V8's ordinary memory/thread syscalls. */
static void checked(int result) {
if (result < 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "seccomp rule: %d\n", result);
exit(1);
}
}
int main(void) {
scmp_filter_ctx filter = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
if (!filter) return 1;
const char *denied[] = {
"fork", "vfork", "execveat", "ptrace", "process_vm_readv", "process_vm_writev",
"pidfd_getfd", "kcmp", "bpf", "perf_event_open", "userfaultfd", "io_uring_setup",
"mount", "umount2", "pivot_root", "chroot", "move_mount", "open_tree", "fsopen",
"fsconfig", "fsmount", "fspick", "mount_setattr", "open_by_handle_at",
"name_to_handle_at", "setns", "unshare", "keyctl", "add_key", "request_key",
"reboot", "kexec_load", "kexec_file_load", "init_module", "finit_module",
"delete_module", "swapon", "swapoff", "syslog", "acct", "sethostname",
"setdomainname", "iopl", "ioperm", "lookup_dcookie", NULL
};
for (size_t i = 0; denied[i]; i++) {
int syscall = seccomp_syscall_resolve_name(denied[i]);
if (syscall != __NR_SCMP_ERROR)
checked(seccomp_rule_add(filter, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), syscall, 0));
}
/* glibc falls back to clone when clone3 is unavailable. Only thread creation
* is admitted; subprocesses and new namespaces cannot be manufactured. */
checked(seccomp_rule_add(filter, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(ENOSYS), SCMP_SYS(clone3), 0));
checked(seccomp_rule_add(filter, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(clone), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, CLONE_THREAD, 0)));
const unsigned long namespaces[] = {CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWNS, CLONE_NEWNET,
CLONE_NEWPID, CLONE_NEWIPC, CLONE_NEWUTS, CLONE_NEWCGROUP};
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(namespaces) / sizeof(namespaces[0]); i++)
checked(seccomp_rule_add(filter, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(clone), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, namespaces[i], namespaces[i])));
checked(seccomp_rule_add(filter, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(socket), 1,
SCMP_A0(SCMP_CMP_NE, AF_UNIX)));
checked(seccomp_rule_add(filter, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM), SCMP_SYS(ioctl), 1,
SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0x5412))); /* TIOCSTI */
checked(seccomp_export_bpf(filter, STDOUT_FILENO));
seccomp_release(filter);
return 0;
}
+66 -31
View File
@@ -37,13 +37,13 @@ export class RestrictedEngineBudget {
let releasing;
const release = () =>
(releasing ??= (async () => {
try {
await resource.release?.();
} finally {
this.#leases.delete(lease);
}
await resource.release?.();
this.#leases.delete(lease);
})());
release.attach = resource.attach;
release.usage = resource.usage;
release.kill = resource.kill;
release.uid = resource.uid;
return release;
} catch (error) {
this.#leases.delete(lease);
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ export async function serveRestrictedRegistry(config, io = process) {
!absolute(config.workerd) ||
!absolute(config.worker) ||
!absolute(config.module) ||
(config.sandbox !== undefined && !absolute(config.sandbox)) ||
(config.sandboxIdentity !== undefined && typeof config.sandboxIdentity !== "boolean") ||
!/^[$A-Z_a-z][$\w]*$/.test(config.registryExport) ||
!Array.isArray(config.exports) ||
!config.exports.length ||
@@ -160,19 +162,38 @@ export async function serveRestrictedRegistry(config, io = process) {
throw fixedError("RESTRICTED_BACKPRESSURE");
io.stdout.write(line);
};
// Linux USER_HZ is 100 on the supported NixOS architectures. Read process
// CPU outside the engine; authored code cannot forge these usage messages.
// A sandbox has namespace helpers as well as workerd. Charge the complete
// delegated cgroup when available; the qualification fallback follows the
// bounded process tree, never trusting a worker's self-reported counters.
const engineUsage = async (engine) => {
if (engine.release?.usage) return engine.release.usage();
engine.processTicks ??= new Map();
const pending = [engine.child.pid];
let memoryBytes = 0,
visited = 0;
while (pending.length) {
if (++visited > 64) throw fixedError("RESTRICTED_PROCESS_LIMIT");
const pid = pending.pop();
try {
const stat = await readFile(`/proc/${pid}/stat`, "utf8");
const fields = stat.slice(stat.lastIndexOf(")") + 2).split(" ");
engine.processTicks.set(`${pid}:${fields[19]}`, Number(fields[11]) + Number(fields[12]));
const status = await readFile(`/proc/${pid}/status`, "utf8");
memoryBytes += Number(status.match(/^VmRSS:\s+(\d+)/m)?.[1] ?? 0) * 1024;
const children = await readFile(`/proc/${pid}/task/${pid}/children`, "utf8");
pending.push(...children.trim().split(/\s+/).filter(Boolean).map(Number));
} catch (error) {
if (!["ENOENT", "ESRCH"].includes(error.code)) throw error;
}
}
return {
cpuMicroseconds: [...engine.processTicks.values()].reduce((sum, ticks) => sum + ticks * 10000, 0),
memoryBytes,
};
};
const sampleCPU = async (call) => {
if (!call.child?.pid) return;
let text;
try {
text = await readFile(`/proc/${call.child.pid}/stat`, "utf8");
} catch (error) {
if (error.code === "ENOENT" || error.code === "ESRCH") return;
throw error;
}
const fields = text.slice(text.lastIndexOf(")") + 2).split(" ");
const total = (Number(fields[11]) + Number(fields[12])) * 10000;
const { cpuMicroseconds: total } = await engineUsage(call.engine);
const cpuMicroseconds = total - (call.cpuBaseline ?? 0);
if (call.engine) call.engine.cpuTotal = total;
if (!Number.isSafeInteger(cpuMicroseconds) || cpuMicroseconds < (call.cpuMicroseconds ?? 0))
@@ -217,8 +238,7 @@ export async function serveRestrictedRegistry(config, io = process) {
// A delayed child request can never acquire the next call's authority.
if (engine.current === call) engine.current = null;
if (!stopped && reason.code === "INVOCATION_ENDED" && !usageFailure && !engine.destroying) {
const status = await readFile(`/proc/${engine.child.pid}/status`, "utf8").catch(() => "");
const rss = Number(status.match(/^VmRSS:\s+(\d+)/m)?.[1] ?? Infinity) * 1024;
const rss = (await engineUsage(engine)).memoryBytes;
metrics.peakRSSBytes = Math.max(metrics.peakRSSBytes, rss);
// Bound retained engine heaps as well as lifetime. Hard aggregate
// physical memory remains the supervising process/cgroup's contract.
@@ -263,10 +283,13 @@ export async function serveRestrictedRegistry(config, io = process) {
if (index >= 0) idleEngines.splice(index, 1);
engine.current = null;
if (engine.child?.pid) {
try {
process.kill(-engine.child.pid, "SIGKILL");
} catch (error) {
if (error.code !== "ESRCH") throw error;
if (engine.release.kill) await engine.release.kill();
else {
try {
process.kill(-engine.child.pid, "SIGKILL");
} catch (error) {
if (error.code !== "ESRCH") throw error;
}
}
await engine.exited;
}
@@ -380,27 +403,37 @@ export async function serveRestrictedRegistry(config, io = process) {
const file = join(engine.directory, "config.capnp");
await writeFile(file, configuration);
if (!call.open) return;
engine.child = spawn(config.workerd, ["serve", "--experimental", file], {
detached: true,
env: { TZ: "UTC", LANG: "C.UTF-8" },
cwd: engine.directory,
stdio: ["ignore", "ignore", "pipe"],
});
if (config.sandboxIdentity && !Number.isSafeInteger(engine.release.uid))
throw fixedError("RESTRICTED_IDENTITY_UNAVAILABLE");
engine.child = spawn(
config.sandbox ?? config.workerd,
config.sandbox
? [engine.directory, ...(config.sandboxIdentity ? [String(engine.release.uid)] : [])]
: ["serve", "--experimental", file],
{
detached: true,
env: { TZ: "UTC", LANG: "C.UTF-8" },
cwd: engine.directory,
stdio: [config.sandbox ? "pipe" : "ignore", "ignore", "pipe"],
},
);
metrics.starts++;
engine.exited = new Promise((resolve) => {
engine.child.once("exit", resolve);
engine.child.once("error", resolve);
});
engine.child.stdin?.on("error", () => engine.current?.terminate("RESTRICTED_START_FAILED"));
call.child = engine.child;
await engine.release.attach?.(engine.child.pid);
watchCPU(call);
let diagnostics = 0;
engine.child.stderr.on("data", (chunk) => {
if ((diagnostics += chunk.length) > 65536) {
if (engine.current?.open) engine.current.terminate("RESTRICTED_DIAGNOSTIC_LIMIT");
else void destroyEngine(engine).catch(fail);
}
} else config.diagnostics?.(chunk);
});
await engine.release.attach?.(engine.child.pid);
if (config.sandbox && call.open) engine.child.stdin.end(Buffer.from([1]));
watchCPU(call);
engine.child.once("error", () => engine.current?.terminate("RESTRICTED_START_FAILED"));
void engine.exited.then(() => {
if (engine.current?.open) engine.current.terminate("RESTRICTED_ENGINE_EXITED");
@@ -512,6 +545,7 @@ export async function serveRestrictedRegistry(config, io = process) {
await finish(call, fixedError("INVOCATION_ENDED"), reply);
metrics.completed++;
} catch (error) {
config.diagnostics?.(Buffer.from(`RESTRICTED_HOST_ERROR:${error.code ?? error.name}\n`));
if (call.open) {
const code = /^RESTRICTED_[A-Z_]+$/.test(error.code ?? "") ? error.code : "RESTRICTED_PACKAGE_FAILED";
await finish(call, error, { invocation: message.invocation, status: "failed", error: { code, message: code } });
@@ -663,6 +697,7 @@ if (process.argv[1] === new URL(import.meta.url).pathname) {
...config,
workerd: process.env.QUIXOS_RESTRICTED_WORKERD,
worker: process.env.QUIXOS_RESTRICTED_WORKER,
sandbox: process.env.QUIXOS_RESTRICTED_SANDBOX,
module: join(dirname(process.argv[2]), config.module),
});
}
+43 -7
View File
@@ -50,7 +50,16 @@ async function fixture(source, options = {}) {
}
};
const service = await serveRestrictedRegistry(
{ workerd, worker, module, registryExport: "registry", exports: ["test"], sdk: [], ...options },
{
workerd,
worker,
module,
sandbox: process.env.QUIXOS_TEST_SANDBOX,
registryExport: "registry",
exports: ["test"],
sdk: [],
...options,
},
io,
);
assert.deepEqual(await receive(), { abi, kind: "ready", exports: ["test"] });
@@ -86,6 +95,27 @@ async function fixture(source, options = {}) {
}
const registry = (code) => `export const registry={exports:['test'],async invoke(request,channel){${code}}};`;
test("uncertain OS cleanup cannot release engine capacity", async () => {
const budget = new RestrictedEngineBudget(1, async () => ({
async release() {
throw Error("kernel cleanup not confirmed");
},
}));
const release = await budget.acquire(
() => false,
async () => {},
);
await assert.rejects(release(), /cleanup not confirmed/);
assert.equal(budget.stats().engines, 1);
await assert.rejects(
budget.acquire(
() => false,
async () => {},
),
{ code: "RESTRICTED_ENGINE_LIMIT" },
);
});
test("parallel frames route independently and cancellation cannot retire a neighbor", async () => {
const f = await fixture(
registry("return await channel({portId:'read',action:{kind:'state',primitive:'read'},input:request.input});"),
@@ -407,15 +437,21 @@ test("bounded FIFO rejects overload without losing active or queued frames", asy
test("queue wait consumes the deadline and cancelled work never reaches its ports", async () => {
const f = await fixture(
registry("return await channel({portId:'read',action:{kind:'state',primitive:'read'},input:null});"),
{ deadlineMs: 350, maxActive: 1 },
{ deadlineMs: 4000, maxActive: 1 },
);
try {
const first = f.start();
await f.receive();
const queued = f.start();
const replies = [await f.receive(), await f.receive()];
assert.deepEqual(new Set(replies.map((x) => x.invocation)), new Set([first.invocation, queued.invocation]));
assert.ok(replies.every((x) => x.error.code === "RESTRICTED_DEADLINE"));
assert.equal((await f.receive()).kind, "port");
// Expire while the first call is deliberately blocked. Two equal relative
// deadlines let fast startup legitimately begin the queued call first.
const queued = f.start(null, { root: "queued-deadline", deadlineMs: 50, depth: 1, calls: 10 });
const expired = await f.receive();
assert.equal(expired.invocation, queued.invocation);
assert.equal(expired.error.code, "RESTRICTED_DEADLINE");
f.send({ kind: "cancel", ...first });
const cancelled = await f.receive();
assert.equal(cancelled.invocation, first.invocation);
assert.equal(cancelled.kind, "cancelled");
const fresh = f.start();
const port = await f.receive();
assert.equal(port.invocation, fresh.invocation);
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Pinned upstream engine. This binary supplies an import/capability boundary;
# production execution additionally requires OS limits and platform approval
# for shared placement, or a workspace VM for unreviewed application code.
# production execution additionally requires the qualified OS identity,
# namespace, syscall, cgroup and invocation-broker boundaries.
{ pkgs }:
let
version = "1.20261005.1";